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Conjecturing that, in testing UIP,  transaction costs may have obscured the relation between 
expected exchange-rate changes and forward premia, Huisman et al.  (1998) focus on days with 
unusually large cross-sectional variances in forward premia (reflecting,  assumedly,  episodes 
with pronounced expectations). They find encouragingly high regression coefficients for those 
special days-"extreme" support, in short. 
We show that, for  extreme forward  premia to be primarily due to a clear signal rather 
than loud noise, the signal needs to be thicker-tailed than the noise.  Transaction-cost-induced 
noise seems to have promising properties:  percentage deviations  from  the perfect-markets 
equilibrium should be (i) bounded (that is, they have no tails and, therefore, cannot dominate 
the extreme forward premia), (ii) wide (that is, they may generate betas below 1/2) and (iii) 
U-shaped in distribution, a feature that turns out to make an "extreme" sample quite effective. 
We derive theoretical and numerical results in the direction of what Huisman et al.  observe. 
JEL F31, G14, GI5 "Extreme Support For VIP" revisited: 
How comes the dogs don't bark? 
Introduction 
Since the work by Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) and Fama (1984) (henceforth COF), regressions 
of realized percentage exchange rate changes on beginning-of-the-period forward premia have 
become the workhorse for tests of Illlcovered interest parity (UIP). In this paper, we  analyze 
recent  results by Huisman  et  al.  (1998).  They apply panel estimation,  singling out days 
where forward premia have an unusually large cross-sectional variance-hence the "extreme" 
in the title-and they impose a numeraire-invariance constraint across currencies. As a result, 
Huisman et al.  report, the COF slope coefficients improve substantially, to the extent that they 
even exceed unity when the cross-sectional variance is extreme.  Huisman et al.'s justification 
for focusing on large-variance days is that, on those days, exchange-rate changes should tend to 
have llllusuaIly heterogeneous conditional expectations, thus providing a sample with a better 
signal-to-noise ratio. In their paper, the noise is caused by transaction costs, but the authors 
do not offer any reason why their logic would not apply to any other factor that is missing 
from the unbiased-expectations equation, like a risk premium or a genuine market inefficiency. 
Articles that provide good news re COF regressions are still sufficiently thin on the grolllld 
to command attention. The main issues addressed in the present paper stem from the finding 
by Fama (1984) that most of  the variability of  the forward premium originates from the missing 
variable rather than from the conditional expectation.  This immediately raises the question 
why, in the Huisman et al.  extreme sample, the dogs did not bark: if one selects a subsample 
where the variance of the forward premia is large,  how comes one is not implicitly picking 
up mostly loud-noise observations rather than clear-signal ones?  Our first result is that the 
Huisman et al.  attempt to reinforce the signal will work indeed if  the signal (the conditional 
expected change in the exchange rate), despite being the lower-variance variable, is the thicker-
tailed of the two.  Our second issue then becomes whether the transaction-cost explanation 
advanced by Huisman et  al.  has the potential to generate a  material improvement in the 
signal-to-noise ratio.  The answer is a guarded yes.  Interestingly, the mechanism that triggers 
the improvement turns out to be subtler than just boosting the signal variance.  Extreme 
sampling can, in fact, also lead to a noise reduction in absolute terms rather than just relative Extreme support for  UIP:  how comes?  2 
to the signal variance.  In addition, extreme sampling induces a covariance between noise and 
signal that further helps eliminating the bias.  Thus,  extreme sampling is  potentially quite 
effective in dealing with transaction-cost-induced noise in the forward rate---even though the 
actual extent of success still depends very much on the parameter constellation. In the process 
of establishing these analytical results,  we  derive and use new  moment conditions to show 
that the missing variable has not only a  high variance and relatively thin tails,' but also an 
uncannily high correlation with the expected exchange-rate change.  Thus, unlike the textbook 
errors-in-variables case, our entire analysis is done in a setting where the error in the regressor 
is correlated with the true value. 
In the remainder of this introductory section we briefly review the literature on the COF 
regression tests of uncovered interest parity (VIP),  and we  make a  link  with the Huisman 
et.  al.  paper.  The empirical failure of VIP in these tests has led to two lines of subsequent 
research.  Some researchers have argued that OLS may be inappropriate or at least inefficient, 
and have used more advanced estimation techniques.  Others have worked on the theoretical 
side, and have studied what properties the missing variables should have to explain the empir-
ical findings,  and what theoretically acceptable model(s) do have these features.  Among the 
missing variables that have been advanced, the (non-constant) risk premium has received most 
attention, starting with Fama (1984).  Others have claimed that the variable that is  missing 
in the empirical tests is a (non-constant) Peso effect, that is,  the low-probability jump that is 
at the back of the market's mind but is rarely, if ever, observed in the data. Still others make 
a  link with transaction costs,  which disturb the normal link between the forward premium 
and the true expectation of the spot-rate change (or,  in the presence of a risk premium, its 
true certainty equivalent).  Lastly, for completeness, the missing factor may be the difference 
between the market's expectation and the true expectation, resulting from an inefficiency. 
Huisman et al.  (1998)  contribute to the methodology side (by adopting panel estimation 
with random time effects and a cross-equation constraint, and by conditioning the COF coef-
ficients on the cross-sectional va..riation of forward premia), but they also tap into the theory 
literature, by linking their approach to a particular missing variable.  Their prime suspect is 
transaction costs. If  real-world markets are subject to friction, they argue, uncovered interest 
arbitrage cannot perfectly align expected exchange rates and forward premia.  Most of the 
time, expectations of exchange rate changes are, moreover, so small that this friction-induced 
noise between expectations and premia largely obscures the theoretical parity between the two. 
However, there may be occasions where the market does expect unusually large changes; and if Extreme support for  UIP: bow comes?  3 
the impact of friction is essentially unaffected by the size of the expected change, then in these 
instances the signal-to-noise ratio must be relatively favorable .. Highly positive or negative 
forward  premia should,  therefore,  be better predictors than small premia.  Cast in familiar 
statistical terms: the COF regression suffers from an errors-in-the-regressor type bias towards 
zero,  and for  a given variance of the noise term this bias can be reduced by constructing a 
subs  ample where the variance of the regressor is larger.  Huisman et al.  test this model  us-
ing panel techniques with a cross-currency constraint that ensures numeraire-invariance of the 
estimates.  They report that large-variance observations generate COF regression coefficients 
close to unity,  and even substantially above unity if the definition of "large variance" is very 
strict. 
In this paper,  we  first  review the link  between the COF beta and its three underlying 
moments-the variances of the expected change and of the bias, and the covariance between 
the two-and we derive additional bounds on these,  tighter than the Fama (1984)  moment 
condition.  In Section 2,  we study the effect of sampling from the tails, first analytically and 
then numerically.  Section 3 concludes. 
1  Moment Conditions for Missing Variables 
Let fr denote the true expected value,  at the beginning of period t  and conditional on all 
then-available information,  of the percentage change in the spot rate over that period;  let 
j) d2  S - S'  denote the unexpected spot rate change,  and P the forward  premium.  Let 
the missing variable or bias (whether it be a risk premium, Peso effect,  an inefficiency,  or a 
transaction-cost effect)  be denoted and defined by b  ~  S' - P,  so that its sign is  that of a 
conventional risk premium.  For simplicity, we omit time subscripts. It is understood that So, 
P,  and b  are conditionally non-stochastic; that is,  the randomness indicated by their tildes 
holds unconditionally only.  By definition, the prediction error j) is conditionally (and therefore 
unconditionally) independent of S' and ii, as the latter two are known at the beginning of the 
period.  Then, in the regression of S d2 S' +  j) on P d2 S' - b,  the slope is determined by the 
three second moments of S*  and b: 
cov(S',P) 
(3  =  var(P) 
var(S') - cov(S', b) 
var(S') - 2cov(S', b) +  var(b) 
1-w 
1-2w+z' 
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h  £  t  th  1  li  el  t·  del  Var(b)  d  de!  COV(S* ,b)  were,  or compac ness,  e  ast  ne uses r  a lve moments, Z  =  var(s*)  an  w  =  var(s*)· 
With respect to the relative variance, z, Fama(1984) presents a simple but insightful moment 
condition, 
~1  ~ 
/3>2<=>z<1.  (1.2) 
As empirical betas tend to be below 1/2, Fama points out, the missing variable must have 
a large variance relative to the variability in the expectations-that is, we must have z > 1 
irrespective of sign or size of the relative covariance, w.  It is simple to derive similar b01lllds 
on w irrespective of z, and one on w relative to z.  It also turns out that a b01llld with respect 
to z can be obtained that is tighter than Fama's, simply from the fact that correlations are, 
at most, equal to unity: 
Proposition 1: Hvar(b) > 0, var(S*) > 0, and R2(S*,b) < 1, then 
<  > 
/3  >  o  <=> w <:  1;  (1.3) 
<  < 
/3  >  1 <=> w;; Z;  (1.4) 
1  1+v'z 
2 <  1 + 2v'z + z <  /3  < 
1-v'z  (1.5)  1  2v'z  if  z < 1,  - z+z 
1-v'z  1+v'z  1.  (1.6)  </3  <  1+2v'z+z<2 ifz>1  1-2v'z+ z 
Proof: provided in Appendix. 
Figure 1 shows  the feasible  values  for  (3,  that is,  the area bounded by (1.5)-(1.6),  for 
0$ z $  7.  On the basis of the Froot and Thaler (1990) meta-average of /3,  -0.88, one would 
conclude that the variance ratio z is, at most, 4.5.  In addition, one can infer from  (1.3)  and 
(1.4)  that the covariance-to-variance ratio, w,  is somewhere between z  and unity.  Actually, 
one can infer even more about the correlation between b and S*,  by generalizing (1.5)-(1.6) 
into 
1+~  <  /3  <  1-~  ifz<1 
1+2~+z  1-2~+z  -, 
(1.7) 
__  I_---,V"=z=.~;d,2~- /3  1 + ~  if  1  <  <  z>  . 
1-2~+z  1+2Jz.~ax+z 
(1.8) 
where R;.ax is a tentative upper bound on the squared correlation between b  and S*.  Suppose, 
for instance, that one deems ~  to be at most 0.9.  Then the range of z that produces betas 
of -0.88 is  narrowed down to about [1.5  , 3.1],  as can be seen from  Figure 2.  Interestingly, 
below ~  =  0.87 we cannot even produce any betas as low as -0.88.  Thus, if  we take the Extreme support for  UIP: how comes?  5 
Froot and Thaler average as our benchmark, then we need to consider a noise-to-signal ratio, 
Z,  between 1 to 4.5, and a correlation between b  and Er  of at least y'Q.87 = 0.93,1.  surely a 
disconcertingly high number. The economic issue (not addressed here) is to explain a missing 
variable that is almost perfectly correlated with the conditional expectation and has a larger 
variance, so that it essentially flips the sign of the signal.  For the statistician, the implication 
is that the covariance between the regressand and the error in the regressor is large relative 
to the variances.  This complicates the issue relative to the standard textbook version of the 
errors-in-variables problem, where the error is assumed to be pure noise. 
What are the statistical implications of that covariance? Holding constant the covariance, 
it is easy to show that, like in a classical textbook error-in-variables case, the variance of b  still 





var(S*) - cov(S*, b) 
[var(S*) - 2cov(S*,b) +var(b)J2' 
j3  ~  ~  ~  _  _  _  _ < 0 if w < 1 <=>  j3 > 0, 
var(  S*) - 2cov( S'  , b) + var(b) 
(1.9) 
- >  <  < 
var(b) - cov(S*, b)  =  0 if  =  j3  = 1  - _  _  _  <  w>z<=>  >  . 
[var(S*) - 2cov(S*, b) + var(b)J2 
(1.10) 
Boosting the variance of the signal is the stated intention of sampling extreme forward premia. 
What needs to be determined is (i) how comes that the Huisman et  at.  procedure of picking 
days with large-variance forward premia seems to be able to produce mainly large-variance 
signals S*  rather than mainly large-variance bSj  and (ii) what is the effect of that sampling 
procedure on the covariance between S*  and b?  The cet.  par.  effect of that covariance is to 
bias j3 towards 1/2: 
8j3  - - >  >  <  var(b) - var(S*)  =.  =  =  1 
_  _  - - <Olfz<l<=>j3>-. 
[var(S*) - 2cov(S*, b) + var(b)J2  2 
(1.11) 
8cov(S*, b) 
In the next sections, we therefore review the impact of a sampling-from-the-tails procedure on 
each of these three moments. 
lThis result can also be obtained directly from fixing beta at -0.88 and writing (1.1) as -0.88 =  l-~~%2) Extreme support for  UIP:  bow comes?  6 
2  The effects of sampling from the tails on the (CO )  variances 
of band S* 
Huisman et  ai.,  who use panel data, select days where the cross-sectional variation in P is 
large, and expect that in such a subsample the COF beta will be large.  In the same spirit, 
Sercu and Vinaimont (1999) follow the original Bilson (1983) procedure and select, within each 
time series, the observations where  1 P 1 is  large.  In either sampling rule the issue is which 
items on the right-hand-side of 
var(P) =  var(S*) - 2cov(S*,b) + var(b)  (2.12) 
go up most when one exclusively samples from the tails of the distribution of P.  In this section, 
we address the issue analytically.  Section 3 then provides numerical results. 
2.1  Boosting var(S*)  or var(b):  a  matter of relative tail-thickness rather 
than variance 
If  one samples extreme value of 1 P I,  why should this primarily be due to extreme values of 
S*  (as Huisman et.  al.  postulate) rather than of b,  especially since the latter seems to be the 
higher-variance summand? It turns out that the predominance of large S*s versus large bs in 
the tails of P depends not so much on the relative variance of the marginal distributions, but 
primarily on the type of distribution-specifically, the relative tail-thickness of b  and S*.  We 
provide an illustration of each of these claims. 
First consider two variables with similar distributions but different variances.  Specifically, 
let b  and S* be bivariate normal with constant moments.  From the definition P d:J  S* - b  it 
follows that S* and P are also bivariate normal.  Thus, for any given value of P, whether small 
or extreme, the best possible conditional forecast of the exchange rate is E(S* 1 P) =  a +  f3P. 
For this reason, in the bivariate-normal case extreme sampling cannot generate any betas that 
systematically differ from aselect sampling.  This must mean that, in the large-I P 1 sample, 
all second moments of S*  and b have gone up by the same factor:  in the bivariate-normal 
case,  sampling extreme Ps does  not affect  the signal-to-noise ratio.  We  obtain this result 
without making any assumption about the relative variance of b and S*.  Thus, for a variable 
to dominate the tails of the sum, a larger variance is surely not sufficient. 
Nor is a high variance necessary for that, as the next example shows.  Let b be uniform, 
and S*  normal, both with mean zero and independent of each other.  The further one goes 
into the tails of the sum, the larger its conditional variance.  But while there is no bound on Extreme support for  UIP: how comes?  7 
the SO-component, in this case there is a limit to what b can add to the sum.  That is, even 
though a sample of extreme I P Is  also tends to pick up atypically large I ii Is,  in the uniform 
case the conditional variance of ii cannot go on rising indefinitely when one goes deeper and 
deeper into the tail to I P  I· 
In this second example,  a  crucial difference between the two distributions seems  to be 
boundedness (for the uniform)  versus unboundedness  (for  the normal).  We  can generalize, 
however:  even if both S'  and ii can assume any value on the real line,  in the tails S'  still 
dominates provided that it has thicker tails.  The proposition also generalizes in the sense that 
it allows for linear dependence between the two summands: 
Proposition 2.  Let S' and ii be related by S' =  J.is + B.ii + e with E(e I b)  =  O.  Then the 
tails of the sum, P  d~  S' - ii, are dominated by large values S* rather than of ii if 
lim P(~'  ~  x) --+ 0, 
",joo  P(b ~  x) 
a sufficient condition for which is that S' has the lower tail exponent. 
Proof: provided in Appendix. 
2.2  The (±6) model for  'ii. 
(2.13) 
The same effects would  be observed if ii  were a  bid-ask bounce generated by a  Bernouilli 
process, 
_  _  _  {1 (i.e.  ii =  +6) with probability 0.5, 
b = -8  + 28.B, where B = 
o (i.e.  ii =  -8) with probability 0.5. 
(2.14) 
If S'  and ii are both symmetric around zero, then also P is symmetric around zero.  Thus, 
large I P Is would still have as many positive outcomes as negative ones; and the underlying iis, 
being equally likely to be positive or negative, would have the same variance as in an aselect 
sample.  Thus, in this case any increase of var(p) generated by sampling from the tails is not 
at all due to bunching of noise;  rather, it must be entirely due to large S's sampled from a 
thicker-tailed distribution, and reduces the bias-toward-zero in /3. 
Is (2.14)  an economically attractive model?  The pure bid-ask bounce model for ii would 
seem to make sense if  the only friction in the market were a spread in the forward rate, as is 
the case with futures transaction prices.  Assuming that the expectation is measured by the 
midpoint forward, the observed forward trade price would be the midpoint price plus or minus 
the half-spread, a perturbation which,  at daily frequencies,  has no traces of autocorrelation Extreme support for  UIP:  bow comes?  8 
(Lehman, 1990; Ball, Kothari and Wasley,  1995).  However, if one's purpose is to explain the 
forward puzzle then bid-ask bounce is  not a good candidate.  In actual practice the forward 
premia as used in empirical work do not suffer from bid-ask bounce, because they are typically 
computed from midpoint swap rates or from domestic and foreign interest rates-both  midpoint 
or both ask (like LIBOR). And more fundamentally, in the presence of friction it is no longer 
obvious that the midpoint forward premium equals the expectation even in the absence of a 
risk premium. 
There are, fortunately, good reasons to believe that the impact of friction is much richer 
than just a bid-ask-bounce effect.  Models with trading costs predict a no-activity zone within 
which the bias P - 13*  can wander without triggering transactions.  Thus, b  is  bounded and 
therefore probably has a  smaller tail exponent than has  13* -a  feature that is  necessary to 
explain the Huisman et al.  effect.  In addition, in these models the zone is much wider than 
just the transaction cost.  Brennan and Schwarz (1988, 1990) and Baldwin (1990), for instance, 
point out that the holder of,  say,  GBP has an American-style perpetual option to switch to, 
say,  USD.  It is  well known that an American option is rationally exercised not as  soon as 
the exercise value becomes positive, but when the exercise value is  sufficiently large.  In the 
same vein,  if trading is costly, risk-neutral holders of GBP will not switch to USD  as soon 
as  13* - P exceeds the transaction cost by a minute amount; rather, since there is  a cost of 
switching back if  and when the gain disappears, it is optimal to wait until 13* - P has become 
sufficiently large.  The fact that the inactivity zone is wide justifies large values for b,  which is 
required if we want to explain betas below 0.5  (Fama, 1984).  Transaction cost models of this 
type however also predict that, while the deviation from UIP stays at the inactivity bounds 
for relatively long times (see e.g.  Constantinides, 1986; Dumas, 1992), the probability of being 
strictly within the band is of course not zero (as it would have been in the (±o) case).  Thus, 
from  the Brennan-Schwarz-Baldwin argument,  the distribution of b would be bounded,  but 
U-shaped rather than having just two separate probability spikes at ±o. 
As we do not know the specific functional form of  the U-distribution for b,  we initially work 
with the Bernouilli-based distribution, where analytical results are quite transparent; and we 
then verify numerically that our analytical results do generalize to a  U-shaped distribution. 
In that analytical work we immediately add another feature to the model, namely correlation 
between band 13*.  In the binary case,  (2.14), the relationship E(S* I  b)  can always be written Extreme support for  VIP:  how comes?  9 
as a linear equation. In short, for most of the remaining analytical work we assume that 
E(E I  b)  =  0, 
E is IID, finite-variance, symmetric and unimodal, 
S* = J.l.s +  B.b +  E,  with  _  {+15 with probability 0.5, 
b= 
-15 with probability 0.5. 
(2.15) 
0< B < 1, 
The constraint 0  <  B d~ cov(S*, b)/var(b)  =  w/ z  <  1 is  motivated by (1.3)-(1.4)  and the 
empirical observation that  f3  <  O.  Graphically,  this works  as  follows.  If b =  0,  the joint 
distribution of period-by-period expectations and forward premia P  plots on the 45-degree 
ray: in the absence of a bias, both variables are of course identical. When b  =  ±15, the S' that 
is associated with a particular P is shifted rightward/downward or leftward/upward relative to 
the 45-degree ray.  The parameter B tells us how much of the shift is vertical versus horizontal. 
In particular, when B =  0 the shift is all horizontal, which corresponds to the pure textbook 
errors-in-variables case.  When B =  1,  in contrast, the shift is all vertical, in which case b is 
similar, in effect,  from  a  pure white-noise prediction error.  The situation relevant to us is 
somewhere in between. 
As  a matter of notation, we let "hi" and "lo"  (as subscripts or as conditioning events in a 
conditional distribution) refer to the events" I P 12::  X"  and "1 P 1<  X",  respectively, where X 
is the percentile value for  I P I that produces a  desired split of the sample, like the 5%  most 
extreme forward premia.  For example,  E(b  I hi) is shorthand for  E(b  I I PI:::: X),  and f3hi 
refers to a beta from a sample consisting solely of extreme I Pis. 
In model (2.15), we can use the equalities S*  =  J.l.s +  B.b +  E and P =  S· - b to specify f3hi 
and the regular (unconditional) beta as, respectively, 
f3hi  = 
f3  = 
B.(B - l)var(b I hi) + (2B - l)cov(b, E I hi) +  var(E I hi) 
(B - 1  )2var(b I hi) + 2( B-1  )cov(b, E I hi) + var(  €  I  hi) 
1 _  (~ - B)var(b I hi) - co~(b, E I hi)  and 
(B - 1  )2var(b I hi) + 2( B-1  )cov(b, E I hi) +  var(E I hi) , 
1 _  (1 - B)~ar(b) 
(1 - B)2var(b) +  var(E) 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
Thus, again, the bias in the marginal beta falls if the noise variance is reduced relative to the 
variance of the premium. 
Let us recapitulate. We found that the signal/noise ratio improves if b  has thinner tails (or Extreme support for UIP: how comes?  10 
no tails), which is quite likely under the transaction-cost story.  In fact,  the apparent success 
of the procedure, in Huisman et al., suggests that we do have that ordering of tail-thicknesses. 
We  have  also  proposed one simple model,  (2.15),  that has some of the crucial features one 
would expect from a transaction-cost model:  boundedness and a large probability mass on or 
near the bounds.  The model is able to generate a wide grid of w and z values.  A weakness 
is that (2.15)  assumes away any probability mass strictly within the bounds; but in Section 
2.5  we  show numerically that such mass has only a small effect on the outcome.  Thus, for 
the above model we now present our results on the items var(b I  hi) and cov(b I  hi) in (2.16), 
respectively.  From the simplified model we show,  first,  that if the exchange rates have zero 
unconditional drift-or, more in general, if  extreme samples are equally likely to come from 
either tail-then the variance of the noise is  not affected  by extreme sampling.  Thus,  the 
signal-to-noise ratio improves,  which probably was the hunch underlying the Huisman et al. 
paper.  This orthodox effect is reinforced by two less obvious ones.  One effect is that, if  the 
exchange rates have nonzero unconditional drift-or, more in general, if  extreme samples are 
more likely to come from one particular tail-then the variance of the noise actually drops in 
absolute terms.  The second reinforcing effect is that the covariance term in (2.16) is negative. 
2.3  The effect of extreme sampling on var(b I  hi). 
Proposition 3. In model (2.15), 
•  if  J.Ls  = 0 (or,  more generally, if upper and lower tails of S' are equally present in the 
extreme sample), then var(b I  hi) =  var(b) =  var(b 110) . 
•  if J.LS  of.  0 (or,  more generally, if upper and lower tails of S' are not equally present in 
the extreme sample), then var(b I  hi) < var(b) and var(b 110) < var(b). 
For var(b I hi), this effect increases the higher the cut-off value X.  For var(b 110),  the 
effect is U-shaped in X. 
Proof: provided in Appendix. 
Table 1 illustrates this effect for a  simple distribution.  In each panel of that table, S' 
and ii are independent and have the marginal distributions indicated in the top row and first 
column, respectively, of the panel.  Panel A assumes a zero mean for S',  while in Panels B 
and C the expectation of S' equals unity.  In panels A and B, "high" outcomes are defined as 
I S' - b  I~ 3,  while in panel C the cut-off value is 4 rather than 3.  The body of each panel Extreme support for  UIP:  how comes?  11 
Table 1:  Examples of a  simple joint distribution of S' and b 
Panel A:  /-Is  =  0,  cutoff at X =  ±3 
S' =-2  S' =-1  S' =  0  S' = 1  S*  = 2 
prob 0.1  prob 0.2  prob 004  prob 0.2  prob 0.1 
b =  +2, prob 1/2  -4  (0.05)  -3 (0.10)  -2 (0.20)  -1  (0.10)  0(0.05) 
b = -2, prob 1/2  0(0.05)  1 (0.10)  2 (0.20)  3 (0.10)  4 (0.05) 
Panel B:  /-Is = 1, cutoff at X = ±3 
S' =-1  S*  =  0  S' =  1  S' = 2  S' = 3 
prob 0.1  prob 0.2  probOA  prob 0.2  prob 0.1 
b = +2, prob 1/2  -3 (0.05)  -2  (0.10)  -1  (0.20)  o  (0.10)  1 (0.05) 
b = -2, prob 1/2  1 (0.05)  2 (0.10)  3 (0.20)  4 (0.10)  5 (0.05) 
Panel C·  /-IS = 1  cutoff at X = ±4  , 
S* =-1  S* =0  S' =  1  S' = 2  S' = 3 
prob 0.1  prob 0.2  prob 0.4  prob 0.2  prob 0.1 
b =  +2, prob 1/2  -3  (0.05)  -2  (0.10)  -1  (0.20)  o  (0.10)  1 (0.05) 
b =  -2, prob 1/2  1 (0.05)  2 (0.10)  3 (0.20)  4 (0.10)  5 (0.05) 
Key to Table 1. In each panel of that table, S' and b  are mutually independent and have the marginal 
distributions indicated in the top row and first  column,  respectively,  of the panel.  Panel A assumes 
a zero mean for S', while in Panels B and C the expectation of S' equals unity.  In panels A and B, 
"high" outcomes are defined as I S' - b  I~ 3, while in panel C the cut-oH value is 4 rather than 3.  The 
body of each panel shows the premia and the corresponding joint probabilities.  If  a cell falls in the hi 
subsample, the probability is printed in italics. 
shows the premia and the corresponding joint probabilities. If  a cell falls in the hi subsample, 
the probability is printed in italics. We easily see that, in Panel A, the distribution of b  given a 
hi event remains symmetric, thus preserving a variance of 4.22.(1/2)(1-1/2) = 4.  In Panel B, 
in contrast, the hi events consist predominantly of outcomes where b  equals -15:  given a high 
I P I,  the probability of b =  +15  now drops from 0.5  to 0.05/0040 =  0.125.  Thus, var(b  I hi) 
drops from 4 to 4.22.(0.125 x 0.875) = 1.75.2 
More in general, if J.Ls  > 0,  the distribution of P has more mBES in the positive domain, so 
- - de!  - - that large Ps tend to be positive rather than negative.  From the relation P  =  S· - b,  this 
means a predominance of negative bs  in the high-I P I sample, and vice versa.  Likewise,  if 
J.Ls  < 0, i) tends to be negative and large I P Is  tend to be associated with positive values for 
b.  If  sampling is thus predominantly from one side of the distribution of  b, then 7r(b =  -15 I hi) 
no longer equals the unconditional probability, 0.5.  Any deviation from 7r  =  0.5  lowers the 
2The table may raise the issue that asymmetric sampling not only lowers the variance of the noise, but also 
the variance of the entire sum and, at first  hlush,  potentially also the variance of the expectation.  However, 
Proposition 2 would still mean that the thicker-tailed variable tends to dominate in the tails.  Case C in the 
table, where the cut-off values are set at ±4 rather than ±3, illustrates this very clearly. Extreme support for  UIP:  how comes?  12 
variance, as can be seen from  var(b I hi) =  482.1T.(1-1T).  Thus, if /J-S  # 0,  the error variance 
is reduced.  If, in addition, 8 is large and the "hi" criterion is sufficiently strict, the sample of 
high I P Is comes almost entirely from events where b  has the same sign.  For example, in Panel 
C of Table 1, raising the hurdle I P I from  3 to 4 means that all hi events are now generated 
by b = -2. The closer one gets to such situations, the smaller var(b I hi), implying that f3hi 
approaches unity. 
2.4  The Effect of extreme sampling on cov(S*,b I  hi) 
Unconditionally, e is independent of b.  But as P depends on b  and S', and S' depends on b 
and e, selecting a sample on the basis of I P I means that sampling is not random with respect 
to e  and b. 
Proposition 4.  in model (2.15), cov(e, b  I hi) < O. 
Proof: provided in Appendix. 
The intuition follows immediately from  the equations P d2 S' - b and S' =  /J-S + b  +  e 
where 8 < 1.  Then P =  /J-S + e - (1 - 8)b with 1 - 8 > O.  As b  can assume only two values, 
namely ±8, a large value of I P I is not due to an unusually large I b  I;  rather, a large I P I tends 
to mean either a large value of I e I,  or opposite signs for e  and b,  or both.  Thus, conditional 
on I P I being large, we expect that e and (1 - 8)b to be of the opposite sign more often than 
what would expected on the basis of the zero unconditional covariance. 
This effect is immediately visible in the example of Table 1.  In the zero-mean example of 
Panel A,  cases where P falls  below -3 occur when S' is negative and b positive;  and cases 
where P exceeds 3 are found where S' is positive and b  negative.  With E(b I hi) and E(S' I hi) 
both being zero and every term in S·.b being negative, the covariance is obviously negative, 
and turns out to be -2.667.  In Panel B, the unconditional mean is of S' is positive rather than 
zero,  which,  as we have seen, makes var(b I hi) drop (from 4 to 1.75).  Not surprisingly, then 
also cov(b, S· I hi) then shrinks towards zero, but it remains negative (at -1.125). 
Thus, if the cut-off values are not set symmetrically around the unconditional mean, one 
might theoretically succeed in getting a sample that is entirely from one of the two 45-degree 
lines  only.  The Huisman et  al.  procedure may actually produce such asymmetric samples: 
since their definition of "hi" is  not currency-specific, they may very well end up with lots of 
lower-tail observations from  weak currencies, and lots of upper-tail observations from  strong 
ones.  As we saw, such asymmetric samples are predominantly drawn from just one 45-degree Extreme support for  UIP: bow comes?  13 
Table 2:  Parameter values used in the simulations 
z =  1.1  z=4  z=7  z=10 
(3 =  0.2,  w =  0.967,  w=O,  w =-1,  w=-2, 
va;r(p)  =  .167  var(P) =  5.000  var(P) =  6.000  va;r(p)  =  7.000 
()= 0.88  ()= 0.00  0= -0.14  ()= -0.20 
(3 =  -0.2  w - 1.014  w =  1.429  w - 1.857  w - 2.286 
va;r(p)  =  .072  va;r(P)  =  2.142  var(P) =  4.286  var(p) =  7.286 
()= 0.92  ()= 0.36  ()= 0.28  (}=0.23 
(3 =  -0.6  w =  1.027  w =  1.818  w =  2.636 
va;r(p)  =  .046  var(P) =  1.364  va;r(p)  =  2.728  (no solution) 
()= 0.93  (}=0.46  ()= 0.38 
(3 =  f3min(Z)  ({3 =  -1)  /3m;,n =  -0.997,  {3min  =  -0.607,  (3min  =  -0.462, 
w=1.033  w =1.999  w =  2.644  w =  3.161 
var(p) =  0.033  var(p) =  1.002  va;r(p)  =  2.712  var(p) =  4.678 
()= 0.94  ()= 0.50  ()= 0.38  (}=0.32 
Key to Table 2: From the preset grid z = {1.1, 4.  7.  1O} and (3 =  {0.2, -0.2, -0.6} we compute w using 
(2.18).  To  get the parameter values in the bottom line we set R2(S*,b) equal to 0.999  and compute 
the lowest value of  (3 as well as the implied value for w.  var(.P) is computed assuming var(S*) = 1, i.e. 
var(.P) = 1-2w + z. e  is implied as w/z. 
line, with upper-tail. observations from strong currencies being mostly on the rightmost/lower 
line, and lower-tail observations from weak currencies mostly on the leftmost/upper line.3 
2.5  Numerical Confirmation of the Results for a  U-shaped distribution of b 
What remains to be done is to numerically verify whether the theoretical effects are sufficiently 
important to explain the effects actually observed, especially if  the distribution of b  is U-shaped 
rather than the discrete ±§ one. 
We proceed as follows.  We select parameter values so as to the generate twelve cases on a 
pre-set grid of  {3 = {0.2, -0.2, -0.6} and z = {1.1, 4,  7, 10}.  We choose z = 1.1 instead of z =  1 
because, at z  =  1,  {3  equals 1/2 irrespectively of w and because, close to z =  1,  the bounds 
on  {3 are hypersensitive to minute changes in the parameters. For each ({3, z) combination, the 
corresponding values for the relative covariance, w,  are then derived from the relation 
tJq cov(s*, b)  _  (z +  1),13 - 1 
w  - - - .  var(S*)  2{3 - 1 
(2.18) 
One combination on this grid, case ({3  =  -0.6, z =  10), is incompatible with the unit upper 
"Note also that the Huisman et ai.  beta is common across currencies but the intercepts are not.  This avoids 
the downward bias that would have arisen if  samples from different 45-degree lines had been pooled together. Extreme support for  UIP: how comes?  14 
bound on R2.  To get results near the bounds offeasibilityfor z = {1.1, 4,7, 10}, we set R2(S*,b) 
equal to 0.999 and take the lower of the two corresponding (3,  from  (1.8).  All this produces 
the set of parameter values in Table 2.  The distribution of €,  the noise in fr =  J.!S +  O.b +  €, 
is Gaussian, and that of b  is a mixture of a uniform on [-0,0) and a Bernouilli.  We chose how 
much of the probability distribution of b is strictly within the bounds, and how much at the 
ends.  From this parameter and w we then compute 0 =  w/z. In turn, this 0 (together with z) 
then implies a value for var(€).  More details are provided in the Appendix. 
Table 3:  Simulated betas (1):  Bernouilli-distributed b;  J.!S  =  0 
z =  1.1,  (3  =  0.2  z =  4,  (3  =  0.2  z =  7,  (3  =  0.2  z =  10, (J  =  0.2 
split  (3IG  (3hi  (Jlo  (3hi  (310  (Jhi  (310  (Jhi 
60.0/40.0  0.12  0.21  -0.21  0.35  -0.03  0.33  0.06  0  .. 31 
80.0/20.0  0.14  0.22  -0.00  0.42  0.08  0.39  0.12  0.35 
90.0/10.0  0.15  0.25  0.09  0.47  0.13  0.43  0.16  0.39 
95.0/05.0  0.17  0.27  0.13  0.51  0.16  0.46  0.17  0.42 
97.5/02.5  0.17  0.30  0.16  0.54  0.18  0.49  0.18  0.44 
z =  1.1, (3  = -0.2  z =  4, (J  =  -0.2  z =  7, (J  =  -0.2  z =  10, (J  =  -0.2 
split  (310  (Jhi  (Jlo  (3hi  (Jlo  (3hi  (310  (Jhi 
60.0/40.0  -0.30  -0.18  -0.86  0.02  -0.63  0.01  -0.51  -0.00 
80.0/20.0  -0.27  -0.16  -0.52  0.14  -0.42  0.11  -0.37  0.08 
90.0/10.0  -0.25  -0.13  -0.38  0.22  -0.33  0.17  -0.29  0.14 
95.0/05.0  -0.24  -0.10  -0.30  0.28  -0.28  0.23  -0.25  0.19 
97.5/02.5  -0.23  -0.06  -0.26  0.33  -0.25  0.27  -0.23  0.23 
z =  1.1, (J  = -0.6  z =  4,  (3  =  -0.6  z =  7,  (3  =  -0.6  -
split  (Jlo  (3hi  (Jlo  (Jhi  (Jlo  (Jhi  - -
60.0/40.0  -0.75  -0.57  -1.20  -0.31  -0.53  -0.94 
80.0/20.0  -0.72  -0.53  -0.91  -0.18  -0.50  -0.16 
90.0/10.0  -0.69  -0.47  -0.77  -0.09  -0.47  -0.42 
95.0/05.0  -0.66  -0.42  -0.70  -0.01  -0.45  -0.42 
97.5/02.5  -0.64  -0.38  -0.66  0.04  -0.43  -0.37 
z =  1.1, (J  =  -1  z =  4,  (3  =  -.997  z =  7,  (J  =  -.607  z =  10, (3  =  -.462 
split  (310  (3hi  (310  (3hi  (Jlo  (Jhi  (310  (Jhi 
60.0/40.0  -1.22  -0.98  -1.04  -0.94  -0.62  -0.58  -0.47  -0.44 
80.0/20.0  -1.17  -0.92  -1.02  -0.91  -0.61  -0.57  -0.47  -0.44 
90.0/10.0  -1.13  -0.84  -1.01  -0.89  -0.61  -0.57  -0.47  -0.44 
95.0/05.0  -1.10  -0.77  -1.00  -0.88  -0.61  -0.56  -0.46  -0.43 
97.5/02.5  -1.07  -0.70  -1.00  -0.86  -0.61  -0.55  -0.46  -0.42 
Table 3 displays the result of the computations for a case we studied analytically (that is, 
b =  ±o, with no mass in the middle),  for  an unconditionally no-drift distribution.  In every 
case, (3hi  rises above the marginal beta listed in the heading of the cell,  and a fortiori above 
(Jlo'  Also,  within every cell  the (JhiS  rise the higher one sets the cut-off values  X.  While, Extreme support for  VIP: how comes?  15 
Table 4:  Simulated betas (2):  H-distributed b;  J.Ls  =  0 
z = 1.1,  f3  = 0.2  z = 1.1,  f3  = 0.2  z = 7,  f3  = 0.2  z = 10,  f3  = 0.2 
split  f3zo  f3hi  f3zo  f3hi  f3zo  f3hi  f3zo  f3hi 
60.0/40.0  0.15  0.21  -0.09  0.27  0.02  0.27  0.09  0.25 
80.0/20.0  0.16  0.23  0.03  0.35  0.10  0.33  0.13  0.30 
90.0/10.0  0.18  0.25  0.10  0.40  0.14  0.37  0.16  0.33 
95.0/05.0  0.18  0.27  0.14  0.43  0.16  0.40  0.18  0.36 
97.5/02.5  0.19  0.30  0.16  0.47  0.18  0.43  0.19  0.39 
z = 1.1,  f3  = 0.2  z = 4,  f3  = -0.2  z = 7,  f3  = -0.2  z = 10,  f3  = -0.2 
split  f3zo  f3hi  (3zo  (3hi  f3zo  (3hi  f3zo  (3hi 
60.0/40.0  -0.29  -0.19  -0.68  -0.07  -0.53  -0.09  -0.43  -0.10 
80.0/20.0  -0.27  -0.16  -0.46  0.03  -0.37  0.01  -0.34  -0.01 
90.0/10.0  -0.25  -0.14  -0.35  0.12  -0.31  0.08  -0.28  0.05 
95.0/05.0  -0.23  -0.11  -0.30  0.17  -0.25  0.14  -0.24  0.10 
97.5/02.5  -0.23  -0.07  -0.25  0.23  -0.23  0.18  -0.22  0.14 
z = 1.1, (3 = -0.6  z = 4,  (3 = -0.6  z = 7,  (3  = -0.6  -
split  (3zo  (3hi  (3zo  (3hi  (3zo  f3hi  - -
60.0/40.0  -0.74  -0.58  -1.05  -0.44  -0.64  -0.57 
80.0/20.0  -0.70  -0.55  -0.86  -0.31  -0.63  -0.54 
90.0/10.0  -0.67  -0.51  -0.75  -0.22  -0.62  -0.51 
95.0/05.0  -0.65  -0.47  -0.69  -0.14  -0.61  -0.49 
97.5/02.5  -0.64  -0.42  -0.65  -0.09  -0.60  -0.47 
z = 1.1, (3 = -1  z = 4,  (3 = -.997  z = 7,  (3 = -.607  z = 10,  (3 = -.462 
split  (3zo  (3hi  (3zo  (3hi  (3zo  f3hi  f3zo  (3hi 
60.0/40.0  -1.18  -0.98  -1.02  -0.98  -0.62  -0.60  -0.47  -0.46 
80.0/20.0  -1.15  -0.92  -1.01  -0.95  -0.62  -0.59  -0.47  -0.45 
90.0/10.0  -1.10  -0.87  -1.01  -0.93  -0.61  -0.58  -0.47  -0.44 
95.0/05.0  -1.07  -0.81  -1.00  -0.91  -0.61  -0.57  -0.46  -0.44 
97.5/02.5  -1.05  -0.77  -1.00  -0.90  -0.61  -0.57  -0.46  -0.43 
qualitatively,  all this is  as  expected, we  also note that the differences between (3hi  and  f3zo 
are substantially smaller than what Huisman  et  al.  obtain.  Nor do we  see the (3his  come 
anywhere near (or above) unity.  Especially the numbers in the lower half of the table, from 
parameter constellations that produce marginal betas in the Froot-Thaler ballpark, are quite 
disappointing:  all f3his  but one remain negative, and the lone exception (0.04, for z =  4 and (3 
=  -0.6 , split 97.5%/02.5%) is quite unimpressive. 
Table 4 demonstrates that the results obtained thus far are not very sensitive to the absence 
of probability mass within [-0, +oj.  On a priori grounds, a U-shaped distribution, with some 
mass in the middle, is more likely indeed.  But when we mix the Bernouilli with a uniform on 
[-0, +0]  and give the latter 25% probability weight, the results hardly change; if  anything, the 
changes are for the worse.  Results for  50% probability weight in the center are available on Extreme support for  UIP: how comes?  16 
Table 5:  Simulated betas (3):  H-distributed b;  /1S  =  0.25 
z = 1.1,  f3  = 0.2  z = 1.1,  f3  = 0.2  z = 7,  f3  = 0.2  z = 10,  f3  = 0.2 
split  f310  f3hi  f3lo  f3hi  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi 
60.0/40.0  0.18  0.23  -0.08  0.29  0.03  0.27  0.10  0.25 
80.0/20.0  0.17  0.26  0.04  0.36  0.10  0.33  0.14  0.30 
90.0/10.0  0.18  0.29  0.11  0.41  0.14  0.38  0.16  0.34 
95.0/05.0  0.18  0.32  0.15  0.45  0.17  0.41  0.18  0.37 
97.5/02.5  0.19  0.34  0.17  0.48  0.18  0.44  0.19  0.39 
z = 1.1,  f3  = 0.2  z = 4,  i3 = -0.2  z = 7,  f3  = -0.2  z = 10,  f3  = -0.2 
split  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi 
60.0/40.0  -0.22  -0.13  -0.63  -0.06  -0.50  -0.08  -0.43  -0.10 
80.0/20.0  -0.22  -0.07  -0.44  0.05  -0.37  0.02  -0.33  -0.01 
90.0/10.0  -0.22  0.01  -0.34  0.13  -0.30  0.09  -0.28  0.06 
95.0/05.0  -0.22  0.13  -0.28  0.20  -0.26  0.15  -0.25  0.11 
97.5/02.5  -0.21  0.21  -0.25  0.25  -0.23  0.20  -0.23  0.15 
z = 1.1,  f3  = -0.6  z = 4,  f3  = -0.6  z = 7,  f3  = -0.6  -
split  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi  - -
60.0/40.0  -0.58  -0.46  -0.97  -0.42  -0.62  -0.57 
80.0/20.0  -0.62  -0.37  -0.81  -0.27  -0.62  0.95 
90.0/10.0  -0.62  -0.23  -0.72  -0.16  -0.61  0.98 
95.0/05.0  -0.62  -0.07  -0.67  -0.08  -0.61  0.99 
97.5/02.5  -0.62  0.16  -0.64  -0.02  -0.60  0.99 
z = 1.1,  f3  = -1  z = 4, i3 = -.997  z = 7,  f3  = -.607  z = 10,  f3  = -.462 
split  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi  f310  f3hi  i310  f3hi 
60.0/40.0  -0.96  -0.80  -1.01  -0.96  -0.61  -0.60  -0.47  -0.45 
80.0/20.0  -1.02  -0.59  -1.01  0.96  -0.61  0.98  -0.47  0.99 
90.0/10.0  -.105  -0.43  -1.01  0.99  -0.61  1.00  -0.46  1.00 
95.0/05.0  -1.04  -0.25  -1.00  0.99  -0.61  1.00  -0.46  1.00 
97.5/02.5  -1.03  -0.21  -1.00  1.00  -0.61  1.00  -0.46  1.00 
request; they confirm that the Bemouilli case tends to provide an overly optimistic picture, 
but only marginally so.  The fact that the amount of mass put between -5 and +5 makes so 
little difference also suggests that our adoption of a H-shaped distribution for b (instead of the 
U-shape that we should have had) is not likely to be material. 
Our theoretical results showed that there should be a gain in effectiveness if  sampling is 
asymmetric, so that the extreme observations tend to come predominantly from one particular 
tail and have similar values  for  b.  The Huisman et  al.  procedure is  likely to produce this 
feature:  "weakness"  and "strength"-i.e.  high or low  interest rates-are highly persistent 
features, so that that extreme-variance days are likely to have abnormally many date where 
strong currencies are at their strongest and weak currencies at their weakest.  To produce such 
asymmetric sampling in our experiments, we set the mean of S' and p. equal to 0.25, keeping Extreme support for  UIP:  how comes?  17 
the cut-offs symmetric around zero at ±X.  To put this number in perspective:  the standard 
deviation of the conditional expectations, a number that in reality is probably rather small, is 
standardized at unity in the simulations.  That is,  we can think of a mean of 0.25  as a small 
number.  As predicted, both conditional variances (for hi and 10)  are lower than the marginal 
variance;  and var(b  I hi) drops steadily as the cut-off value X is  increased, while  var(b  110) 
is  U-shaped in X.  The impact of all this on (3  can be quite strong for  selected parameter 
configurations, notably in cells (z = 7, (3 = -0.6) and (z = 4, (3 = -1) where the extreme betas 
get quite close to unity.  When the unconditional mean is set equal to twice the variance of 
S'  (results not shown), we get such betas also for an adjacent cell.  Thus, the procedure does 
have the potential to generate quite high betas, and specifically for parameter constellations 
that are in the Froot-and-Thaler ballpark.  4 
3  Concluding remarks 
The empirical failure  of the UIP model suggests that a  variable  (b)  needs  to be added to 
the forward  premium P.  Fama (1983)  showed that a  (3  below  1/2 means that the missing 
variable shows more variability than the signal S·. We provide some additional information. 
For instance, a negative (3  means that also the covariance between signal and noise is larger 
than the signal variability.  And the Froot and Thaler meta-average (3 of -0.88 caps the noise-
to-signal variance ratio at 4.5,  and implies a whopping 0.9  lower  bound on the correlation 
between signal and noise. 
One of the possible explanations behind the failure of the unbiased expectations hypothesis 
is that the relation between expected exchang&rate changes and forward premia is obscured 
by transaction costs effects.  Huisman et  al.  (1998)  treat this transaction-cost effect  as  an 
errors-in-th&regressor problem, and note that the resulting bias toward zero should be reduced 
in samples with a better signal-to-noise ratio.  Occasionally,  expected exchang&rate changes 
can be very pronounced,  leading to unusually large forward premia.  Accordingly,  Huisman 
et  al.  focus  on days where forward  premia tend to be exceptionally large,  and find  that in 
these "extreme samples"  the bias toward zero is reduced (and perhaps even reversed).  But 
there is  a possible flaw  here:  given unusually large expectations, one expects larger forward 
4True, the effects actually observed by  Huisman et al.  are much more extreme what is  predicted here, but 
within our setting that must have been pure luck:  there is  no  way  a  model with a true slope of unity can 
generate an expected coefficient way  above unity.  Huisman et al.  do not provide t-tests on the deviation from 
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premia indeed,  but that does  not necessarily mean that, given unusually large premia,  also 
expectations tend to be outsized.  For the second part of the statement to be true on average, 
the distribution of the conditional expectations must be thicker-tailed than the density of the 
missing variable.  Interestingly,  a  transaction-cost model is  likely to generate that property 
(Constantinides, 1986, and Dumas, 1992):  transaction costs lead to a no-activity cone around 
the perfect-markets price,  and the price tends to spend unusually long times at the border 
relative to, say,  a uniform distribution.  Also,  the cone is far wider than the equilibrium price 
increased/decreased with the percentage transaction cost:  if switching to and fro  between 
currencies is  costly,  one wants currency B  to move  deep into the money before converting 
one's A-holdings into B  in the first  place.  In short,  in this type of model the percentage 
deviations from the perfect-markets equilibrium should be (i) bounded (that is,  they cannot 
dominate the extreme forward premia), (ii) wide (that is,  they can generate betas below .5) 
and (iii) U-shaped in density.  We  approximate the U-distribution by a H-distribution and 
derive theoretical results for  a special case.  From the numerical verifications we  find that, 
for  parameters in line with Froot and Thaler,  extreme sampling can eliminate a lot of the 
transaction-cost-induced noise in forward premia.  The mechanisms are more subtle than one 
would expect at first blush. For example, extreme sampling not only boosts the signal variance, 
but also induces a signal-noise covariance that improves beta, and may even lower the noise 
variance in absolute terms.  Also,  extreme sampling seems to be at its best when, for a given 
currency, large premia tend to come from from one end of the expectations distribution only. 
It is quite likely that this mechanism was active in the Huisman tests, too. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove (1.5)-(1.6), set ~f;~) = w and  v~r:::) = z so that 
l-w 
(3= 1-2w+z'  (A.l) 
provided that 1 - 2w + z  =F  O.  As  the correlation between Er  and b  is below unity,  and as 
R2(S*,b) =  w2/z, we  know that w is bounded by ";z.R2 with R2 < 1.  For any given value 
of z,  the value of w that maximizes or minimizes (3  s.t.  w2  :::;  z always is a corner solution, 
because 
8  l-w 
8wl-2w+z 
l+z 
(1- 2w +  z)2 Extreme support for  UIP:  how comes?  19 
#  0 for  - vz < w < VZ.  (A.2) 
Thus, provided that 1-2w +  z # 0, the extrema for /3, given z and given R2 < 1, are obtained 
by setting w  at the bounds, ±VZ. This leads to (1.5)  and (1.6).  QED 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
The relations P = [r - band S' = J.Ls +  B.b +  £ immediately imply that S' - J.Ls = (B - l)b +  £ 
with b and £ independent.  In a more standard notation, we are considering a two independent 
variables, X and Y, and we want to know to what extent the upper- tail probability of the sum, 
P(X + Y  > x) with x  a large positive number, is determined by the upper tail probabilities 
of X  and Y, and similarly for the lower tail.  Let X  be the thicker-tailed variable.  Obviously, 
a high (low) value for X + Y  is  not generated by extreme Ys when Y  is  negative (positive), 
so we are primarily interested in Y's contribution to the upper tail when Y  is positive, and in 
Y's contribution to the lower tail when Y  is negative.  In the Lemma below, a to the best of 
our knowledge unpublished result kindly provided by Jef Teugels, it is shown that even when 
Y  is positive it does not contribute to the upper-tail distribution of the sum and vice versa. 
Lemma (Thugels):  Let (X, Y) be a randomly drawn vector from a joint distribution, and let 
X  be the thicker-tailed of the two in the sense that5 
I·  P(Y ~  x)  0  un  --+  . 
xroo P(X ~  x) 
(A.3) 
Let X  have dominatedly varying tails, i.e.  for all a > 0 and some non-negative a  we have6 
P(X ~  ax) < K  -a 
P(X ~  x)  - a  .  (A.4) 
Then even when Y > «)0 the upper (lower) tail of the distribution of the sum is unaffected 
byY: 
1.  P(X + Y  ~  x I  Y  > 0) 
1m  --+  1, 
xroo  P(X ~  x) 
(A.5) 
1.  P(X + Y  ::; x I  Y  < 0) 
1m  --+  1. 
xl-oo  P(X ::; x) 
(A.6) 
Proof:  We prove the case where Y > O.  We immediately have 
5 A sufficient condition for  this is that both variables are Pareto distributed with X  having the lower tail 
exponent. 
6This class comprises the Pareto-type class of distributions (notably when K  =  1) and a fortiori the classical 
Pareto (when P(X > x) = x-Q). See Bingham et aI.  (1987). Extreme support for  UIP: how comes?  20 
P(X + Y  > x I  Y  > 0)  ?:.  P(X > x),  (A.7) 
implying that 
lim P(X + Y  > x I  Y  > 0)  > 1. 
"'ioo  P(X > x)  -
(A.S) 
To get an inequality in the other direction, we first note that, in the case we are interested in 
(Le.  deep in the right-hand tail), x is positive.  We then use 
P(X + Y > x I  Y > 0)  :s:  P(X > x(l- a»  + P(X :s: x(l - a), Y > ax) 
:s:  P(X > x(l- a»  + P(Y > ax). 
Dividing both sides by P(X > x) we get 
P(X +  Y > x I  Y > 0) 
P(X > x) 
lim _P-,,(  X_+~Y:-=:>_x---'-,I  :-Y_>~O) 
xioo  P(X > x) 
:s:  P(X> x(l - a»  + P(Y > ax) 
P(X > x)  P(X> x) 
P(X > x(l - a»  P(Y > ax)  P(X > ax) 
P(X > x)  + P(X > ax)' P(X> x) 
Ii  P(X > x(l - a»  0  K  -a  :s:  m  +  .  a 
"'ioo  P(X > x) 
:s:  Ii  P(X > x(l - a» 
"'i~  P(X > x)  , 
(A.9) 
where the third line uses (AA) and (A.3).  Taking a to be arbitrarily small, results (A.S) and 
(A.9) imply (A.5).  QED. 
The proof of proposition 2 follows immediately. If  Er  has the higher tail exponent relative 
to b, the tails of the density of the forward premium is determined by the density of !r. QED 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
In the table below,  we  set out the critical values for  E'S  conditional probabilities and partial 
means in each of the four cases when I P I (i. e.  I  S* - b  I) exceeds x-<iepending on the sign 
of b,  and, for each of these cases, first for the right and then the left tail: 
partitioning of the  probability  partial mean of S' 
S* high-I P I events  conditional on b 
case 1: S' - b > X with b = +0'  d! 00  d! 00 
i.e.  E > X - Its + (1 - 8)0' d;! €l 
11'1  ~ J f(€)d€  11'1.(/LS + 80') + PI, PI  ~ J  €f(€)d€ 
£,  £1 
case 2:  S' - b < -X with b = +0'  d£!  £2  d  f  £2 
i.e.  E < -y  - Us + (1 - 8JO' ~  €2 
11'2  =  J f(€)d€  11'2.(/LS + 80') + P2, P2  ~ J €f(€)d€ 
-00  -00 
case 3: S' - b > X with b = -0'  de!  00  d  f  00 
i.e.  E > Y - Us - (1 - 8)0' d;! €3 
11'3  =  J f(€)d€  11'3.(/LS - 80') + P3, P3  ~ J  €f(€)d€ 
£3  £3 
case 4 S' - b < -X with b = -0'  d£!  £.  d  f  £. 
i.e.  E < X - Its - (1 - 8)0' d;! €4 
11'4  =  J f(€)d€  11'4.(/LS - 80') + P4,P 4  ~ J €f(€)d€ 
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The familiar solution for the conditional variances of a Bernouilli b  is 
var(b I hi) = 462.7l"(b =  61 hi).[l - 7l"(b =  61  hi)],  (A.10) 
and likewise for  var(b  110).  Note that 7l".(1  - 7l")  is  maximal for  7l"  =  1/2.  With the above 
definitions of the events, the probability of b  =  +6, conditional on a high I PI, is given by 
7l"(b = 6 I hi) =  7l"1 +  7l"2  . 
(7l"1  + 7l"2) +  (7l"3 +  7l"4) 
(A.1l) 
The sign of 7l"(b  =  6  I hi) - 1/2 is  the sign of (7l"1  +  7l"2)  - (7l"3  +  7l"4)  or,  equivalently,  of 
(7l"2 - 7l"4)  - (7l"3  -7l"t).  The latter can be interpreted as 
-)(-/L+(1-8)8  )(-/L+(1-8)8 
J  f(€)d€ - J  f(€)d€,  (A.12) 
-)(-/L-(1-8)8  )(-/L-(1-8)8 
which is negative (Figure A1):  both areas are 2(1 - B)6 wide,  but in a symmetric, unimodal 
distribution, if  JiB  > 0 then the area above [-X - JiB  - (1 - B)6, -X - JiB  +  (1 - B)c5],  being 
more off-center, is smaller than the area above [X - JiB  - (1- B)6,X - JiB  +  (1  - 8)c5].  Thus, 
7l"(b  =  6 I hi) < 1/2.  Similarly, when JiB  is negative, we have 7l"(b  =  6 I hi) < 1/2.  Therefore 
var(b I hi) < c)2  = var(b). 
Also from proposition 2, the probability of a positive b  when I P I is low is given by 
7l"(b=61Io)=  1-(7l"1+7l"2) 
[1- (1r1  + 1r2)] + [1- (7l"3  + 7l"4))" 
(A.13) 
If  JiB  > 0,  then 7l"(b =  6 110) > 1/2, meaning likewise that var(b 110)  < 62 =  var(b).  Initially, 
this phenomenon becomes more important the higher the cut-off value.  However, for large X, 
the high-I  P I sample becomes so  small that more and more of the "b  =  -6" observations 
end up  in the low-I  P I sample.  That is,  all  7l"iS  shrink.  In  the limit,  with a  very strict 
definition of " hi" , almost the entire distribution of P is classified as low-I PI, and 7l"(b = 6 110) 
again approaches the marginal mean, 1/2.  Thus, for increasingly stricter definitions of "hi" , 
var(b 110) first falls and then inches up again to var(b) = 62.  QED. 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Th '  f  (- -b  I h·)'  th  th'  f  de!  COV(eS'lhi)  th  d·t·  I  .  e SIgn 0  COV  €,  t  IS  e same as  e SIgn 0  {hi  =  variblhi)'  e con I IOna  regresSIOn 
coefficient of i on b.  As b  can assume only two values, this regression coefficient can be written 
as the slope of the line through the points (6, E(i I hi n b  =  6))  and (-6, E(i I hi n b  =  -6)). Extreme support for  UIP: how comes?  22 
Using the definitions of the table in Proposition 3, the events" hi n ii = Ii"  and"  hi n ii = -Ii" 
can be rewritten as "€:::; f2 U € 2: f1"  and "15:::;  €4  U € 2:  f3", respectively.  Thus, 
def cov(€, S' I  hi)  E(€ I  € :::;  f2 U € 2: €I) - E(€ I  € :::;  f4 U € 2:  (3) 
"(hi  =  var(ii I  hi)  =  21i  .  (A.14) 
We now show that the numerator on the right hand side is negative.  Let 
f (f) =  the density of €,  symmetric and unimodal with mean zero 
'Trb  =  F(fb) , the probability that €:::;  fb 
?fa  =  1 - F(fa), the probability that € 2: fa 
¢(  fj fa, fb)  =  the density of € given that € is in the tails, i.e.  (€:::; fb U € 2: fa) 
We easily establish the relationship between F(€) and iI>(fj fa, fb)-see Figure A2: 
•  on [fb,t"a),  (?fa +'Trb).iI>(€j fa, fb)  remains fiat while F(f) rises from 1fb to l-?fa, i.e.  by an 
additional (1 -?fa - 1fb)j 
•  beyond fa,  (?fa + 'Trb).iI>(fj fa, fb)  again rises in step with F(f) but from  a level that is 
(1 -?fa - 'Trb)  below F(f). 
In short, 
{ 
7i'~i€~b  for € :::;  fb, 
iI>( fj fa, fb)  =  .!(+€b)  for  fb < € < fa, 
7l'a  7rb 
F(€)-(l-7i'a-1l"b)  _  F(€)-l + 1  £  - < 
1l"a+1l"b  - ;ra+1l"b  or f _  fa· 
(A.15) 
We need to rank E(€ I  € :::;  f2  U € 2: €I)  versus E(€ I  € :::;  f4 U € 2:  (3)  where €4 < f2  < f1  and 
t"4 < f3 < fl·  The expectation of € given that € :::;  fb  or € 2:  fa  can be derived from 
+00 
E(€ I  €:::;  €b  U € 2: fa)  =  J  f¢(fj fa, €b)df(€) 
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+00  J  [1- 4'>(Ej Ea, Eb))d!(E),  (A.16) 
-00 
where the second line,  a  familiar result, follows  from partial integration.  We now establish 
that over the entire integration range we have 4'>(Ej El, E2)  > 4'>(Ej E3, £4),  which is  a  sufficient 
condition for the ranking E(€ I  €..:;  E2 U € ::::  E1) < E(€ I  €..:;  q  U €::::  E3).  We start with the case 
J.!s > 0 and use the result from Proposition 3 that, 
(A.17) 
From this it immediately follows that, below q  and beyond E1, we have 4'>(Ej E1, E2) > 4'>(Ej E3, £4) 
(Figure A3): 
•  on [-00, £4), both 4'>s  rise in €,  with 
•  on [E1, (0), both 4'>s  also rise in €,  with 
Equations (A.18) and (A.19) trivially imply 
4'>(E4jE1,E2)  >  4'>(E4j E3,E4), 





It then follows  that also on  [E4,E1)  we have 4'>(EjE1,E2)  >  iI>(Ej E3, £4).  This is  because,  as 
illustrated in Figure A2, 
•  on [E4,E2),iI>(EjE1,E2)  goes  on rising  (from  a  higher starting point,  see  (A.18)),  while 
iI>( Ej  E3, E4)  initially stays fiatj 
•  on [E3, E1),  4'>(Ej 03, q) starts rising, but in light of of (A.19) it never quite catches up with 
4'>( Ej  E1, E2)  even in the range where the latter is fiat. 
Thus, when J.!S > 0,  then everywhere we have iI>(EjEl,E2) > 4'>(EjE3,£4), implying, from (A.16), 
that E(€ I  €..:;  E2 U €:::: E1)  < E(€ I  € ..:;  E4 U €::::  E3).  This establishes the proof when J.!s > O. 
Next suppose that J.!s < o.  Then 
(A.22) Extreme support for UIP: how comes?  24 
We now use the symmetry-around-zero property for f(f) to restate the problem: 
-E(€ I  € ~  -fa U€ ~  -fb) 
-E(€ I  € ~  e: U€~  €b),  (A.23) 
where ~  ~  fb  and €b  d~  fa.  Thus, the ranking E(€ I  € ~  f2 U € ~  (1) < E(€ I  € ~  f4 U € ~  fa) 
is equivalent to the ranking E(€ I € ~ €i u € ~  f'2)  > E(€ I € ~  f3 U € ~  f'4),  and a sufficient 
condition for the latter is that, everywhere,  W(f; ft, (2) < W(f; fa, (4)'  Figure A4 pictures the 
critical points in the original and the restated problem.  We see that the critical range for the 
lower-probability event is now to the right of the range of the higher-probability event, as was 
the case when /-ts > O.  Tlrus,  mutatis mutandis the previous proof still applies. 
Technical Note on the Simulations 
Define w ~  cov(S*, b)/vax(S*) and z ~  vax(b)/vax(S*).  Consider the regression S* = {3P+v 
where 
l-w 
{3 =  "'-1---2:-w-+-z  (A.24) 
We  work  with the grid of {3s  and zs  explained in the main text (Table  2),  and determine 
the implied values of w,  (J,  and vax(€).  We then generate a simple U-shaped distribution for 
"6,  as follows.  Let U =  U( -a,  +a) be uniformly distributed on [-a, a]  where a  > 6.  Then 
11"( -6  ~  U  ~  +6) =  ~, which then implies 
- - 1  (  6)  1I"(U < -6) =  1I"(U > +6) =  2  1 - ~  . 
We generate b  as 
! 
-6 
b~  :, 
if  fJ  ~-6 
if - 6 < fJ < +6  ,density =  2~' 
This implies a mean and variance given by 
E(b) 






(A.30) Extreme support for  UIP:  bow comes?  25 
The above implies that we need to pre-set one additional variable, which we  chose to be 
8/  a. This ratio indicates how much of the mass of b  is on the bounds, ±8. The limiting cases 
are (i) [a -> 00,8 > 0]  (implying 8/a =  0), a binomial distribution with variance &lj  and (ii) 
a  =  8,  a continuous uniform distribution with variance 82/3. The implied value of 8 is found 
from 
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The figure shows the highest and lowest possible values of beta for various levels of the noise-to-signal variance 
ratio. 
Figure 2:  bounds on fJ  for various z d,:j  ;:';~1) for the il!.." =  .9 
The figure shows the highest and lowest possible values of beta for various levels of the noise-tO-Signal variance 
ratio when the R2  between signal and noise is at most .90. Extreme support for  UIP:  how comes?  28 
Figure Al 
In a symmetric, unimodal distribution, the area below the curve of width 2(1 - O)e  is  larger than another one 
with the same width is the former is  closer to the center. 
A\, /1\, 
-X-J.l±(I-B)3  0  X-J.!±(I-6)3  -X-).L:!:(1-9)8  X-J.!±(1-B)3 
Figure A2:  The link between F(t) and <I>(t  Ita, tb) 
FigureA3 
Figure A4:  Restating the problem when J.!  < O. 
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